

Q1 *A Tour of Tor*

(6 points)

As a reminder, when connecting to a normal website through Tor, your computer first queries the Tor consensus to get a list of all Tor nodes, and using this information it connects to the first Tor node and, from there, creates a circuit through the Tor network, eventually ending at an exit node.

Q1.1 (1 point) Consider the scenario where you are in a censored country and the censor chooses not to block Tor, the censor is the adversary, and no Tor relays exist within this country. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to prevent the censor from blocking your traffic.

- ☒ One ☐ Four
☐ Two ☐ Tor doesn't stop this adversary
☐ Three

Solution: The censor doesn't block Tor and the relay is outside of the country, so one hop will get you safely past the censor. The censor will see you sending packets to an encrypted Tor relay but will not be able to determine who you're actually communicating with. This is equivalent to using a VPN where the VPN server is in a different country.

Q1.2 (1 point) Consider the scenario where you are the only user of Tor on a network that keeps detailed logs of all IPs contacted. You use Tor to email a threat. The network operator is made aware of this threat and that it was sent through Tor and probably originated on the operator's network. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to guarantee the network operator can't identify you as the one who sent the threat?

- ☐ One ☐ Four
☐ Two ☒ Tor doesn't stop this adversary
☐ Three

Solution: Since you are the only user of Tor, the network operator just needs to look at the IP of the only person trying to connect to a Tor relay. The network operator can look through the list of IPs and see that you contacted a Tor relay regardless of how many relays you use.



Q1.3 (1 point) Consider the scenario where there is a single hostile Tor node but you don't know that node's identity, and that node can be an exit node. You want to keep confidential from this node what HTTP sites you are visiting through Tor. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to guarantee this adversary can't know what sites you visit?

- ☐ One ☐ Four
- ☒ Two ☐ Tor doesn't stop this adversary
- ☐ Three

Solution: If you only use a single relay, then if that relay is hostile they will be able to see your request and the site you're visiting. If you use two relays, the first relay cannot see your request, and the second can see your request but doesn't know who it's from. So in either case, you are protected.

In other words, if the second relay is positioned between you and the hostile node, the hostile node will not know the request originated from you since it only sees the incoming request coming from "that other node." If the second relay is positioned between the hostile node and your destination, then while the hostile node knows the request comes from you, it doesn't know the destination since it forwards the request to "that other node."

Q1.4 (1 point) Consider the scenario where there are multiple independent hostile Tor nodes but you don't know their identities, and these nodes can be exit nodes. You want to keep confidential from all these nodes what HTTP sites you are visiting through Tor. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to guarantee that every independent hostile node can't know what sites you visit?

- ☐ One ☐ Four
- ☒ Two ☐ Tor doesn't stop this adversary
- ☐ Three

Solution: The solution is the same as the previous question. Since the hostile nodes are independent (non-colluding), it doesn't matter that there are multiple. No individual node can ever know both your identity and the request as long as you use at least two relays.

(Question 1 continued...)

Q1.5 (1 point) Consider the scenario where there are multiple colluding hostile Tor nodes but you don't know those nodes identities, and these nodes can be exit nodes. You want to keep confidential from all these nodes what HTTP sites you are visiting through Tor. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to guarantee that the colluding system of hostile nodes can't know what sites you visit?

☐ One

☐ Four

☐ Two

☒ Tor doesn't stop this adversary

☐ Three

Solution: Now, since the hostile nodes are colluding, you cannot ever be sure you are anonymous since you could get “unlucky” and have every node in your path be colluding hostile nodes.

Note that in real life, using three relays makes the probability of this happening negligible (assuming a certain amount of randomness in relay selection).

Q1.6 (1 point) Consider the scenario where there is a single hostile Tor node but you don't know that node's identity, and that node can be an exit node. You want to have data integrity for the HTTP sites you are visiting through Tor. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to guarantee this adversary can't manipulate the data you receive from the sites you visit?

☐ One

☐ Four

☐ Two

☒ Tor doesn't stop this adversary

☐ Three

Solution: The exit node could modify the HTTP response without detection before forwarding the HTTP response to you.

Q2 *Suit of Armor Around the World (SP22 Final Q8)*

(4 points)

You are tasked with securing The Avengers' internal network against potentially malicious protocols! For each type of firewall and set of traffic, state whether the firewall is able to achieve the desired functionality with perfect accuracy. **Assume that IP packets are never fragmented.** All connections that are not mentioned can be either allowed or denied.

If you answer Possible, briefly (in 3 sentences or less) how the firewall should operate to achieve the desired effect. If you answer False, provide a brief justification for why it isn't possible.

Q2.1 (1 point) **Desired Functionality:** Block all inbound TCP connections. Allow all outbound TCP connections.

Firewall: Stateless packet filter

☒ Possible ☐ Not Possible

Solution: This is possible by blocking all inbound packets with only the SYN flag set, which prevents inbound connections. This allows outbound connections by allowing outbound SYN packets, and the resulting inbound SYN-ACK packet is allowed.

Q2.2 (1 point) **Desired Functionality:** Allow all outbound TLS connections. Block all outbound TCP connections that aren't running TLS.

Firewall: Stateful packet filter

☐ Possible ☒ Not Possible

Solution: While a stateful packet filter *can* reassemble a TCP data stream and look for signatures of a TLS handshake, it can still be circumvented with techniques such as sending multiple small TCP segments with the same sequence number but differing TTLs.

Q2.3 (1 point) **Desired Functionality:** Allow outbound DNS requests. Block inbound DNS responses. Assume that name servers always listen on port 53.

Firewall: Stateless packet filter

☒ Possible ☐ Not Possible

Solution: This is possible (although it doesn't achieve much). One would allow outbound UDP datagram packets with the destination port 53 but block inbound UDP datagram packets with source port 53.

Q2.4 (1 point) **Desired Functionality:** Block all HTTP traffic that contains the literal string **Ultron**. Allow all other HTTP traffic.

Firewall: TCP proxy

☒ Possible ☐ Not Possible

Solution: TCP proxies allow the TCP stream to be reconstructed exactly. Once the stream is reconstructed, the firewall can keep track of the entire HTTP request as state and, if it contains the string **Ultron**, drop the connection.